been allowed to function as intended or to prepare a plan for the orderly development of the City, as was made mandatory by the act [creating the Commission], the Commission is undoubtedly a handicap, rather than a help,-a hindrance to public business." ' 13 Intended to facilitate efficiency and discipline, the city planning commission had by 1924 become a vestigial part of what Seymour considered a poorly managed municipal government. This frustration of New Haven's local movement was representative of a wider national frustration. 14 Scholars trying to account for the failure of city planning in New Haven during the period prior to zoning 5 have typically pointed to either a lack of political and public support1 6 or the effectiveness of land use coordination under the existing common law and prevailing social norms.' 7 Each of these related factors played a role in that failure. Resistance among some local officials and some members of the public, often arising from their satisfaction with the current land use regime, did help limit what planners and planning proponents could achieve. This Note, however, focuses on a further impediment: the limits of available legal doctrine and municipal governance for the proposal and implementation of comprehensive programs of city planning. These limits helped to define what planners could propose and the means by which cities could seek to achieve their ends.
Although they were subject to some dispute and revision, the concepts of eminent domain" 8 and the police power' 9 were fairly well-defined at the time, making it clear which regulations and government takings were permissible. 20 At both the national and local levels, the limits imposed by these doctrines caused much debate and affected both the shape and 13. Seymour Quits Board, supra note 1, reprinted in SEYMOUR. supra note I. 
(1961) ("A city plan commission was created [by New
Haven] in 1913 but was given neither funds nor a professional staff."); Pearson & Wrigley. supra note 2. at 310-12 (citing politics and a lack of public support for city planning). 17 . See Andrew J. Cappel, Note. A Walk Along fillow: Patterns of Land Use Coordination in Pre-Zoning New Haven (1870 -1926 , 101 YALE LJ. 617 (1991). 18 . A treatise on eminent domain from this period defined the power simply as "'the taking of private property for the public use." PHILIP NICHOLS, THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN at ni (1909).
19. One proponent of city planning cited a contemporary legal encyclopedia that defined the police power as a city's ability to prohibit "'all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. and establishing such rules and regulations for the conduct of all persons, and the use and management of all property, as may be conducive to the public interest."' Walter L. Fisher. Legal Aspects of the Plan of Chicago, Appendix to DANIEL H. BURNHAM & EDWARD H. BF.NNETr. PLAN OF CHICAGO 125. 129 (1909) (quoting 22 AM. & ENG. ENCYC. LAW 916 (2d ed. 1902)); see also ERNST FREuND. TiHE POUCE POWER § 3, at 3 (1904) (defining the police power as aiming "directly to secure and promote the public selfarc. and it does so by restraint and compulsion"). 20 . See STANLEY K. SCHUL.TZ, CONSTRUCTING URBAN CULTURE: AMERICAN CmEs AND CITY PLANNING, 1800-1920, at 35-42. 75-81 (1989) success--or lack thereof-of early twentieth-century city planning. Furthermore, the nascent administrative bureaucracies of cities like New Haven proved to be ineffective instrumentalities for implementation of programs in the face of the constraints of formal legal doctrines. In challenging these constraints, however, planning proponents began the long process of changing legal doctrine and land use regulation. In turn, this helped to enable the rise of municipal zoning ordinances in the mid-1920s 21 and served as an important precedent for the far more radical "urban renewal" projects of New Haven in the decades after World War 11.22 Part I provides an overview of the dominant conservative legal doctrines and governing practices that limited planners' goals and strategies during the period from 1907 through 1913,23 and that planning advocates sought to change. Part II provides a narrative of the New Haven planning movement prior to the publication of the Gilbert-Olmsted report on city improvement in 1910. To illustrate the difficulties facing the nascent planning movement in New Haven, Part II chronicles an early attempt by planning proponents to expand the creation and enforcement of one form of land use regulation, building lines. Part III discusses the Gilbert-Olmsted report, the reaction to it, and the events that led to the establishment of a new administrative agency in New Haven devoted to city planning. Parts II and III include not only those arguments about law and municipal structure made by participants in the New Haven movement, but also those made by attorneys and lay planning proponents associated with the national planning movement. Part IV summarizes the role of law and governance in limitating upon what planners during this era could propose and what the municipal administrative agencies that planners advocated could enact and enforce. In addition, Part IV describes the relationship between the early city planning movement and the centralized city planning that would occur in the years after World War II.
I. A "MAZE OF OBSTACLES": LEGAL AND MUNICIPAL STUMBLING BLOCKS FACING EARLY CITY PLANNING
By the time of the Gilbert-Olmsted report's publication in 1910, the ascendant national planning movement had developed enough expertise to recognize the fundamental legal issues at stake in city planning and to begin to describe them in reports, conferences, and books. Two important 21. See sources cited supra note 15. 22. On the redevelopment of New Haven in the post-war period, see DAHL, supra note 16; G. WILLIAM DOMHOFF, WHO REALLY RULES? NEW HAVEN AND COMMUNITY POWER REEXAMINED (1978); ALLAN R. TALBOT, THE MAYOR'S GAME: RICHARD LEE OF NEW HAVEN AND THE POLITICS OF CHANOE (1967) ; and RAYMOND E. WOLFINGER, THE POLITICS OF PROGRESS (1974) .
23. The period that this Note describes runs from the commissioning of the Gilbcrt-Olmsted report in 1907, see infra Section II.A, to the city and state legislature's approval of a city plan commission for New Haven, see infra notes 149-151 and accompanying text.
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[Vol. 107: 1093 developments in this regard were the establishment in 1907 of the first American city planning commission by Hartford, Connecticut, 2 and the inclusion of an extensive essay 25 on the legal issues involved in a city plan by a prominent Chicago attorney named Walter Fisher in Daniel Burnham and Edward Bennett's celebrated 1909 Plan of Chicago. 26 The establishment of the Hartford Commission represented the beginning of a national trend toward including planning within the administrative structure of municipal governments. Fisher's essay was the first in a series of attempts by members of the bar associated with the city planning movement to discuss the relationship of planning to municipal governance and the common law. 21 One of the underlying themes of these legal reports was that doctrinal and political barriers in American courthouses and legislatures constituted city planning's greatest foes. As Olmsted wrote in his introduction to a book-length volume on the legal implementation of city planning, public officials and lawyers for cities faced "the constantly recurring problem of finding the way of least resistance for navigating a specific improvement through the maze of obstacles imposed by the existing local legal situation." ' ' These situations had given rise, according to Olmsted, to city officials' "almost fatalistic acceptance of these obstacles as a permanent condition. 29 In particular, restrictive conceptions of the police power and eminent domain frustrated the planning proponents' attempts to propose and implement changes. Conservative legal views on the scope of municipal authority also thwarted the planners. John Dillon's important treatise on the municipal corporation, already in its fifth edition by 1911,30 embodied this cautious approach with its concerns that the growing complexity of city charters and the expansion in municipal 24 While Fisher's appendix to Burnham and Bennett's Plan of Chicago was in circulation at the time of the New Haven report, the legal issues at stake did not change between 1909 and the early attempts to establish comprehensive zoning schemes in the next decade. Legal discussions and commentaries offered consistent strategies about how to frame winning legal arguments. Other than differences in scope-due to the nature of his project, Fisher focuses far more on specific county and city laws than either Bassett or Shurtleff-the three works are quite similar. Dillon was an important figure in the national legal community who had served as state stprcme court justice, professor of municipal law at Columbia College, counsel for the Union Pacific Railroad. and president of the American Bar Association. See MORTON J. HORWrrZ, THE TRANsFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 25, 97 (1992); SCHULTZ. supra note 20. at 66-75. Dillon's treatise on the municipal corporation was known in the New Haven corporation counsel's office. which cited the "stnngent and extraordinary" limitations on the power to condemn in a 1913 advisory opinion. See Letter from The Yale Law Journal government could endanger the sanctity of private property. 31 The following two sections briefly summarize the "obstacles" of the "existing local legal situation" that planners faced.
A. Legal Doctrines
During the early part of the twentieth century, there were three legal doctrines available for planners who advocated the expansion of municipal regulation of private land use: nuisance, the police power, and eminent domain. While state courts were receptive to private plaintiffs' nuisance complaints, 32 the proponents of planning saw eminent domain and the police power as far more effective means to implement public projects and city planning. Neither doctrine, however, was flexible enough to support the systematic and comprehensive redevelopment of the modern city.
Theoretically, the police power was a fairly flexible doctrine that allowed for systematic, municipally controlled land use regulation. 33 In practice, however, the doctrine's flexibility was more limited. According to the leading contemporary treatise on the subject, for example, restrictions for aesthetic purposes under the police power would "constitute a substantial impairment of the right of property, and the maintenance of an official standard of beauty would not easily be recognized under our theory of constitutional law.' 34 The city's ability to take land under its power of eminent domain faced even stricter federal and state constitutional limits, backed by public resistance to what Americans perceived to be the potential for governmental abuse inherent in such a power. 35 American cities seeking to take land under eminent domain for planning purposes had to assert that their takings would constitute a public use of the property. 36 3 1. See I DILLON, supra note 30, § 24, at 39-40 (asserting that property owners "who have to bear the burden" should have a "controlling voice" over municipal management of these improvements 33. See 2 DILLON, supra note 30, § 660, at 994 (noting the lack of limits on the police power, so long as any use of such power is performed for the "public welfare"); FREUND, supra note 19, § 3, at 3 (calling the police power "elastic" and "capable of development"). On the development of the police power in the late 19th and early 20th centuries generally, see HORwrrz, supra note 30, at 27-30; and SCHULTZ, supra note 20, at 75-81. 34 The police power and eminent domain constituted the grounds upon which planners and planning advocates could formulate legal strategies to succeed in their projects. These legal doctrines both limited planners' visions and shaped their conceptions of how to justify these visions' purposes and implementation. In asserting the legality of implementing Burnham and Bennett's Chicago plan, for example, Fisher argued that "the restraints of the fundamental law under which we live do not forbid any of the steps recommended in the proposed Plan of Chicago, although in many important respects they do fix and control the manner in which, and the means by which, these steps can be taken."" As Burnham himself said to an international planning conference held in 19 10 in London:
In a continuing democracy nothing will be done illegally: if conflict between purpose and law arises, the latter will be changed before the former is carried into effect, for a democracy cannot continue unless the people are intelligent, and real intelligence is, first of all, appreciation of law and order. 38 Neither dismissive of legal doctrine nor entirely intimidated by it, planning advocates and sympathizers could and did perceive applicable legal doctrines as somewhat flexible-so long as any changes that they advocated did not overstep the acceptable framework that Bennett, Burnham, and Fisher implied. Recognizing the limits of this "law and order," planners had some confidence that their ongoing efforts to push the law to expand municipal power, eminent domain, and the police power could allow cities and their planners greater discretion in takings and land use regulation. As the New Haven planning advocates found, however, this confidence was misplaced. Seemingly flexible legal doctrines proved to be a source of ongoing frustration for the creation of their notion of the modem American city.
in the era of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) . to employ such conceptual definitions of government takings of private property, see Stephen A. Siegel. Lochner Era Jurtuprudence and the American Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. I. 26 n.112 (1991) . The archetype of permissible municipal use of the power of eminent domain was the taking of land for a street. Since the early 19th century, American cities that used this practice assessed compensation by debiting property damages against the benefits of the new street, so that property owners either received no money or much less than the pre-taking value of the confiscated land. The Yale Law Journal
B. Municipal Government
Dillon's widely accepted explication of the law of municipal corporations also stood in the way of planners' desire to use the city government as a tool for implementing large-scale planning projects and land use regulation. His treatise was best known for "Dillon's Rule," his oft-cited call for the strict construction of municipal powers:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers and no others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessary or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the corporation,-not simply convenient, but indispensable. Any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by the courts against the corporation, and the power is denied. 39 Under Dillon's Rule, a city's charter froze its municipal powers, and the flexibility that city planners might desire-an adaptable notion of "public use" for eminent domain and wide authority to regulate land use under the police power, for instance-required explicit textual authority.
Even before the first stirrings of the city planning movement, Dillon's Rule did not go unchallenged. An important jurisprudential opponent was Thomas M. Cooley, a treatise author and Michigan Supreme Court justice. In a famous 1871 concurrence, Cooley described his theory of local sovereignty and a limited role for the state:
The state may mould local institutions according to its views of policy or expediency; but local government is matter [sic] of absolute right; and the state cannot take it away .... The right in the state is a right, not to run and operate the machinery of local government, but to provide for and put it in motion. 40 Notwithstanding Cooley's opposition, Dillon's Rule remained dominant during this period. For example, an important 1923 book on municipal governance stated that the rule was "so well recognized that it is not nowadays open to question." 4 ' Somewhat flexible legal doctrines and a "rule" of limited municipal governance constituted a problematic context for early twentieth-century planners and planning advocates, enabling them, on the one hand, to utilize eminent domain for certain projects, but keeping them from exercising expansive powers through city government, on the other. This context would not prove conducive to a thriving city planning movement in New Haven.
II. ESTABLISHING THE MOVEMENT IN NEW HAVEN, 1907-1911

A. Commissioning the Gilbert-Olmsted Report
According to its most vocal leader, George Dudley Seymour, the modem city planning movement in New Haven began with an open letter he wrote to the city government and New Haven citizens in June of 1907.42 Ostensibly responding to private efforts to build a hotel on the north side of the New Haven Green, the letter argued not only for reserving that part of the city's center for public buildings, but also for "the necessity of immediately securing from experts a plan along the lines of which the city may be developed by this and succeeding generations.
From this document onward, Seymour attempted to establish that his proposals were decidedly practical and relatively modest, 44 as well as necessary to keep New Haven in line with the burgeoning national and international city planning movement. 4 5 If led by objective experts who would be able to eliminate the internal conflicts and corruption of local government, Seymour argued, the movement would enable more efficient and efficacious "great enterprises" of municipal development. Less than three weeks after Seymour's letter, a meeting of interested citizens in New Haven's Colonial Hall approved a formal resolution establishing a mayor-appointed civic improvement commission "to secure experts and to go ahead with designing a working plan. 47 Significantly, the Commission as proposed had no powers beyond hiring the plan's authors and had to procure for itself the necessary funding. It was not, in other words, to be a powerful municipal committee, but rather a private, philanthropic enterprise with no guarantee of any effect and no power to carry out any of its proposals.
The Commission's first meeting, held on July 1, 1907, in the Mayor's office, led to the invitation of Gilbert and Olmsted to formulate the plan. In addition, the meeting set in motion an ultimately successful scheme to fund the effort through subscriptions from "citizens of known public spirit. '49 The idea of city planning was not threatening to New Haven's upper class, which was fully prepared to fund the enterprise and, with Seymour in charge and prominent men on the commission, to control it. There was some scattered local criticism over the next few years, aired in the local newspapers and letters to the Mayor. Generally, the criticism concerned such issues as the costs of beautification 50 and the absence of ethnic and gender diversity on the commission. 51 The term "beautiful," however, seemed quickly to become part of general public discourse about urban problems. 52 City Planning in New Haven commission originally referred to the project as a "Plan" to improve the city, not as an endeavor to make the city "beautiful,"" ' within a few months, the daily New Haven Register would explicitly link the local movement to the much larger national City Beautiful movement. 4 The article printed the entire charter amendment establishing the Hartford planning commission and proposed a similar municipal commission for New Haven that would be "out of the reach of party politics and bungling," "far reaching in its breadth and powers," and able to provide a "central plan" to which the "whole city" must "conform. 55 Despite such endorsements of an ambitious approach to city planning, Cass Gilbert recognized the limits of local support and the need to craft the New Haven report so as not to alienate a majority of the public. A letter from Gilbert to Seymour the following February illustrates this well: I find that in a part of the work upon which I am especially engaged there are many questions that might be called "questions of public policy" which should receive careful consideration as well as the questions of design. Mr. Olmsted and I will try to solve them both, but when we are bringing into question the modification of existing buildings and streets grave questions will present themselves. As has been said before, "you cannot make an omelet without breaking some eggs," and so we must expect a certain amount of opposition and the best way to meet it is to prepare the way step by step.5 "Public policy" in Gilbert's parlance would seem to encompass and link a wide range of issues, from local law and politics to popular opinion. Such issues and the public's perceptions of them required deference and care.
One strategy Gilbert used was a shift in terminology to redefine the project's design and purpose. From the start, he and Olmsted had described the project to Seymour as producing "'a plan [that] must be practicable as well as beautiful, or it will fail to commend itself to the community.'-1 7 In an April 1908 interview with the New Haven Journal-Courier, Gilbert made a point to remove the term "beautiful" from his and Olmsted's endeavor: "I feel that the phrase 'City Beautiful' is not a proper term to use [for this project] and it is likely to create a false impression. The development of the city should be along practical lines with reference to the convenience of traffic and beautiful" planning). usefulness. 58 Gilbert apparently assumed that property owners, politicians, and voters not already associated with the local planning movement would require utilitarian reasons to accept city improvements achieved through the use of eminent domain and the police power as well as through the expenditure of public funds.
Reflecting the general movement among city planners and architects, Gilbert was likely attempting to distance his work from the earlier City Beautiful movement. That general movement had begun in the mid-i 890s, and by 1907 its focus on urban parks, landscaping, monuments, and civic centers composed of clusters of public buildings was beginning to be expanded into what was known -as the "City Practical" movement. 5 9 The latter placed a greater emphasis on the systematic planning of the entire city for utilitarian ends, and its leaders worked to establish a need for their professional expertise in the growing bureaucracies of municipal governments.6 It thus fell within the more general arguments of the Progressive movement, ascendent during this era, 6 ' which sought to reform city governments of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries through greater municipal self-control, 62 , 1969) . See also FREDERICK LAW OLMSTED, AMERICAN CIVIC ASS'N, CITY PLANNING 8 (1910) (arguing that "the real work of getting the results, toward which any paper plan is but a step, depends mainly upon the right sort of unremitting, never-ending work by the proper administrative officials"); SCOTr, supra note 9, at 95-100 (discussing the First National Conference on City Planning and the Problems of Congestion, held in 1909 in Washington, D.C., which explicitly differentiated itself from the City Beautiful movement). 62. Progressives pursued a number of strategies to achieve greater municipal self-control. Some argued that, to avoid the strict construction of municipal powers asserted by Dillon's Rule, state governments should pass statutes aimed at granting cities "home rule" over their own governance. See, e.g., FRANK J. GOODNOW, MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 267 (New York, MacMillan & Co. 1895) (arguing for greater powers for local government, "subjected to a responsible administrative control"). Eugene McQuillin, whose important treatise on municipal corporations was first published in 1912, argued that municipal self-control was virtually a natural right, and a power like that of eminent domain "appertains to every independent government" and is "an attribute of sovereignty." 4 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1453 n.3, at 3070-71 (1912). The National Municipal League, founded in 1897, argued a combination of these two positions-that state governments should allow cities to define and administer their own powers in recognition of the inherent sovereignty of the city. See HORACE E. DEMING, THE GOVERNMENT OF AMERICAN CmES 234-37 (1909) (summarizing "The Municipal Program" of the National Municipal League). Finally, American planning proponents also noted that other western nations allowed far greater municipal use of eminent domain. See, e.g., BASSErr, supra note 27, at 4 (comparing favorably eminent domain in Canada and "European countries" to the power of the United States); L.S. ROWE, PROBLEMS OF CITY GOVERNMENT 142-43 (1908) (contrasting European cities' rights "to exercise all powers not inconsistent with state laws" and their "rigid system of administrative control" to govern state-local disputes with Dillon's strict construction of municipal powers); Robert A. Edgar, Legal 1998] City Planning in New Haven 1105 the "bosses" of machine party politics with the centralized authority of well-trained "experts" who would be responsive to an electorate. 63 Under a Progressive regime of municipal governance, legal entitlement and authority shifted from property owners to the executive branches of municipalities, who had earlier enjoyed greater latitude in the use of their property because of open-ended regulation and uneven enforcement. With the proper authority, the new city government could "preserve the health, morals, and efficiency of the citizens" in order to counteract "the exploitations" of a few private inhabitants who operated in "wanton disregard of the rights of the many. '6 1
The movement for city improvement in New Haven gathered momentum as Seymour became more involved with the national city planning movement" and was able to gain increased support from New Haven newspapers. 66 In addition, the city's two most prominent civic groups, the Chamber of Commerce and the Civic Federation, became increasingly involved in the New Haven movement, especially after the election of Isaac Ullman to the presidency of the Chamber in 1909. Ullman's address upon election focused on the City Beautiful movement, which he commended for its aesthetic and commercial goals. 67 Under his leadership, the Chamber became far more active in public and private initiatives concerned with land use. 68 The Civic Federation, dedicated to promoting "the civic welfare" rather than commercial interests, 69 worked together with the Chamber on a number of issues, eventually including city planning. 70 These elite civic organizations would play a prominent role in the conflict over building line setbacks from the curb, a relatively obscure land use regulation that became a public issue in 1909 and continued to be a source of controversy through 1913. Pitting the leadership of civic organizations, the legislative and executive branches of New Haven city government, and some property owners against one another over the legitimacy and enforcement of municipal land regulation, the conflict over building lines previewed the broader struggle over city planning that would arise after the publication of the Gilbert-Olmsted report.
B. The Conflict over Building Lines: Eminent Domain and the Bureaucratic Solution
Building lines, the distance that buildings must be set back from the curb, were the most important land use issue in New Haven during the period immediately prior to the publication of the Gilbert-Olmsted report. The conflicts that arose around the establishment and enforcement of building lines foreshadowed the events that followed the release of the report, demonstrating the doctrinal and governmental limits facing both professional planners like Gilbert and Olmsted and their local patrons and supporters in prominent civic organizations.
For planning proponents, the establishment of building lines enabled cities to widen streets without having to take improved land and, therefore, to pay less compensation under the power of eminent domain.' In addition, city planning proponents argued that building lines produced orderly and aesthetically pleasing streets by creating relative uniformity in building frontage and better enabling the circulation of light and air.7 As Edward Bassett, an attorney and planning advocate, implicitly noted in devising a litigation strategy for defending building lines against legal challenge, however, legal arguments based on health and safety concerns were more likely to succeed during this period than those based upon aesthetic purposes." Mandatory, uniform lines for buildings, Bassett argued, could decrease fire hazards, bring more light and air into homes and apartments, and keep noise and dust away from open windows. 7 " So long as a city established constitutionally permissible procedures 75 and properly argued the merits of building lines under the police power, Bassett was confident that lines would, like restrictions on building heights before them, 76 pass muster. 7 During this period, city planning advocates throughout the country seized upon building 71. See, e.g., SHURTLEFF, supra note 27, at 204 (citing the "tlesxibtlity" that building lines allow cities that wish to widen streets in the future). line ordinances as examples of laws whose enforcement would make for a more efficient, beautiful city. 78 Building lines were among the oldest forms of municipal land use controls in New Haven. 79 Between 1908 and 1910, conflicts surrounding the creation and enforcement of building lines in New Haven focused on accusations made by the Mayor 80 and the Corporation Counsel 8 ' that the Board of Aldermen was violating established formal procedures for the passage of building lines, especially by granting variances for individual property owners. 8 " In addition, civic groups played an important role in pressing the Aldermen to enforce existing laws. By early 1910, the Civic Federation and the Chamber of Commerce asked Olmsted to prepare a brief proposal for building lines in the city's first ward while the Gilbert-Olmsted report was in production. The result, ultimately reproduced as an appendix to the Gilbert-Olmsted report, was general enough to provide a rationale both for strict citywide enforcement of the regulation and for the establishment of building lines suitable for the future widening of all streets where the need for their widening was foreseeable.' Yet, Olmsted argued that for economic reasons and to preserve the legitimacy of the city's regulation of private land use, building lines should be gradually enforced over a long period of time. Given his extensive contacts in New Haven and the motives of those commissioning the pamphlet, Olmsted clearly knew of the local conflicts concerning building lines. His suggested solution to the shortcomings of municipal politics was the establishment of a permanent building lines commission, "constituted somewhat after the manner of a Park Commission and acting through a Building Line Bureau in the City Engineer's Department." 8 6 The final sentence of the Olmsted report moves even further in the direction of a consolidated, independent governmental commission employing its expertise in the development and regulation of the city: "Probably the best sort of body for dealing with this building line question would be one constituted after the manner of the Hartford City Plan Commission and with similar broad duties in addition to those of determining building lines." ' 87 Thus, before the publication of his and Gilbert's full report, Olmsted had used the topic of building setbacks to argue for comprehensive city planning to oversee and legitimate the city's regulation of land use.
The reading of Olmsted's report at a February 1910 meeting of the Aldermanic Committee on Building Lines caused some controversy among property owners. 88 Nevertheless, local newspapers endorsed building lines, 9 and the Corporation Counsel continued to remind the Board of Aldermen of the procedure necessary to establish and enforce building lines.' Finally, in August 1911, the Board passed an act establishing a new building lines commission as a separate administrative body. 9 ' The Commission's powers, however, were limited to establishing lines in new streets and in parts of streets that were widened or extended; it could only regulate existing streets by petition of the public or by the "order or direction" of the mayor or the Board of Aldermen. 92 This new, "independent" commission would be limited in its ability to establish and enforce building lines by its need to rely upon a public largely uninterested in the regulation of property, a municipal legislative 86 The Yale Law Journal branch that until recently had engaged in the practice of granting illegal variances, 93 and an executive officer who was reelected every two years. 9 " The Building Lines Commission, therefore, was a governmental entity intended to perform one regulatory task that the city charter had initially authorized almost ninety years before. As such, it represented a solution, born of compromise, to what the mayor, the corporation counsel, and elites affiliated with prominent civic groups considered to be a problem of land use regulation. The problem that the Commission was intended to solve was not simply doctrinal-there seemed to be no question of the city's longstanding ability to regulate building setbacks under its police power, and everyone involved seemed to agree that compensation should be paid to property holders affected by changed lines on established blocks. Nor was the problem simply an entrenched municipal government-as we have seen, despite the active resistance of the Board of Aldermen, the city continually restructured its approach to the building lines process. Ultimately, the implementation of an efficient, extensive building lines bureaucracy of the type requested by Olmsted and his prominent local supporters was limited by the fairly narrow conception of permissible public regulation of private land use in New Haven and in most of the country during this period. 95
Ill. THE GILBERT-OLMSTED REPORT AND AFTER: TOWARD A CITY PLANNING COMMISSION
Gilbert and Olmsted's report, intended to describe the current state of New Haven in its entirety and to propose a plan for its future, was published less than a year before the establishment of the Building Lines Commission." The report's contents and influence would replicate the process seen in the conflict over building lines: the identification of a problem, the identification of available legal and political solutions, and the establishment of a bureaucratic 93. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text. 94. NEw HAVEN, CONN., CITY CHARTER § 6 (1905). 95. Ongoing conflicts between the Board and the Commission would continue even after a 1913 charter amendment that ostensibly took the Board out of the Commission's work. See New Haven, Conn., An Act Establishing a Special Commission on Building Lines § 9 (Apr. 30, 1913) (requiring only the approval of the mayor, along with the long-established processes of hearing and compensation, to make the lines proposed by the Building Lines Commission legal). As late as 1915, the Chamber of Commerce complained:
Some recent meetings of the Building Lines Commission would seem to indicate that the city feels less the meaning of [the importance of building lines] in respect to its future than it did even three or four years ago when the attempt was first made to straighten the whole matter.
In some residential streets in the best quarters of the city, many people seemed to prefer to leave themselves to the mercy of any property owner who was willing to exploit his own lot at his own profit at the expense of the rest of the community. 
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A. The Gilbert-Olmsted Report
The long-awaited Gilbert-Olmsted report, commissioned in 1907 and finally published in December 1910, was a handsome, comprehensive attempt to delineate the problems of the unchecked "'urban metropolis of the twentieth century" and to offer a series of solutions. 97 The report described a historical shift from the individualism that had well served the "pleasant little New England college town" of the nineteenth century, to the collective needs of the modem, twentieth-century city, whose dense population relied on common utilities, services, and transportation infrastructure." The report presented a continuum, placing outdated "individualism" on one end, successful mutual dependence in the middle, and "socialism in its controversial aspects" at the opposite extreme. 99 Their report, Gilbert and Olmsted implied, was an attempt to develop the sensible middle approach, that is, to cure the chaotic excesses of an unregulated marketplace operating under a limited common law. It aimed to do so with a more expansive legal regime enforced by an expert and objective municipal apparatus.
Gilbert and Olmsted argued that this was a practical solution to a potentially dangerous problem:
People of the old New England stock still to a large extent control the city, and if they want New Haven to be a fit and worthy place for their descendants it behooves them to establish conditions about the lives of all the people that will make the best fellow-citizens of them and of their children. The racial habits and traditions, the personal experience and family training, the economic conditions and outlook, of the newer elements of the population, are such that a laissez faire policy applicable to New England Yankees is not going to suffice for them.'0°A ccording to the report, then, the core of New Haven's modern problems was the combination of modernity and race. A chart, based on findings discussed in greater detail in the report's statistical appendix, predicted that the rising birth rates and lowering death rates of the "foreign born" population would lead to a drop in the proportion of residents "native born of native parents" relative to the "foreign born" and the "native born of foreign parents.'' The 
1998]
The Yale Law Journal goal of "civic improvement" was to improve the social stability of the city by improving the city's physical conditions:
It is the duty of the city to conserve [its] natural [economic and physical] advantages and so to control its development that the man-made conditions of living and working-the housing, the transportation, the sanitation, and all the rest of it-shall make possible the greatest productive power along with the greatest satisfaction in the work and life.1 0 2 One of the central areas needing improvement was the street system, which required an efficient and well-considered plan to create wider streets on the most important and traveled paths of traffic. The report suggested not only a comprehensive street plan, but also the creation of a powerful department of public works with authority to use the power of eminent domain to widen streets at its own discretion.' 0 3 As was the case with Olmsted's earlier report on building lines,' 4 however, the Gilbert-Olmsted report supported a piecemeal approach. It proposed the immediate drafting of a plan to identify those streets that would need future widening but advocated a program of implementation that would take place over an extended period of time. 03 It aimed in this way to save money and protect the legitimacy of the city's use of eminent domain.
Other areas needing improvement included the maintenance of shade trees; t ' 6 unsightly overhead wires, whose vulnerability to storm created a safety hazard, especially in the city's downtown areas; 0 7 the abundance of unsightly billboards and commercial signs; 0 8 the sewer system;'°9 and the park system." 0 In all of these areas, the report's descriptions and suggestions were similar: The city needed an efficient, businesslike municipal government to lead the cooperative efforts of government, private corporations, and individuals in attacking all of the city's problems at once. Nevertheless, given the authors' evaluation of the city and the efforts necessary to combat its ills, the report is striking in its modesty and its absence of concrete, systematic proposals. Moreover, unlike the Burnham-Bennett plan for Chicago,"' the Gilbert-Olmsted report included no focused discussion of the relevant legal framework within which these improvements were to take place.
For example, the report's promotion of a piecemeal approach to street widening and building lines demonstrated a reluctance to exploit the city's power of eminent domain to its full potential. Sympathetic commentators and judges during this period cited growing legal and public sentiment favoring an expanded definition of the "public use" requirement for eminent domain to allow cities a more expansive takings power." 2 While the most significant cause of the report's hesitancy was likely the expense of compensation for extensive takings," 3 Gilbert and Olmsted did not suggest ways to circumvent the payment of compensation, electing to promote a gradual approach even in areas like commercial streets, where the benefits of a wider street could offset the costs of lost property. Their hesitancy toward eminent domain, then, was attributable both to concern with legal limitations and to a desire to keep this awesome power legitimate given the likelihood of resistance by property holders (as demonstrated in the building lines dispute). (adding the words "[alesthetie purposes" to the renumbered section. citing numerous cases decided since 1888, and finding the legal question of whether "aesthetic purposes" could fall under the "public use" requirement of eminent domain to be unsettled).
In the most sanguine treatise statement about the prospects for further expansion of eminent domain for city planning and the municipal arts, Eugene McQuillin claimed in 1912 that recent legislatise efforts in cities reflected the fact that a desire to render the urban centers more attractive has found a firm lodgment in the popular mind. It is destined to increase with the years, and in the development of the law in this respect courts will be inclined to give a broader interpretation to such regulations, and finally sanction restrictions imposed solely to advance materially attractiveness and artistic beauty 3 McQUILLIN, supra note 62, § 929, at 2022-23. Nevertheless. McQuillin also noted that at the time, aesthetic considerations could not alone support a city's use of the police power or eminent domain to restrict or take property. See id. at 2021; see also NICHOLS, supra note 18. § 232. at 269-70 (noting a gradual change in American law and culture toward allowing takings for an aesthetic purpose, so long as there was a showing of "material advantage to the public"). For an even more confident statement, from 1911, claiming that municipal corporations could take land for aesthetic purposes under eminent domain power, see Edgar. supra note 62, at 365. See also SHURThEF.. supra note 27. at 21 (asserting that. with public support, using eminent domain for aesthetic purposes could be legal)' FRANK BACKL S WILLiA.tS. THE LAW OF CITY PLANNING AND ZONING 19-20 1922) (citing vanous state court decisions from 1907-1915 for the proposition that, in reviewing municipal government acts performed under the city's police and eminent domain powers, courts had been influenced by "'current usage and custom" as whell as popular opinion); Wilbur Larremore, Public .,Estherics, 20 HARV. L. REv. 35. 36 (1906) (descnbing an altematie means of allowing "aesthetic" takings under eminent domain).
113. See OLMSTED, supra note 72, at 137-38 (citing savings for the city through deferral of compensation and reduced interest payments).
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Similarly, in addressing the overbuilding of tenement housing that led to overcrowded apartments cut off from light and air, Gilbert and Olmsted proposed neither to regulate private tenements under the police power nor to erect public housing-precisely the solutions posed by housing expert Lawrence Veiller, whose report on tenement conditions in New Haven would be published later in 1911."' Instead, the report offered its standard suggestions of parks and streets, proposing that the city acquire the interior land of large tenement blocks and either form playgrounds or cut new streets in order to open the land to "a better class of development."' ' 5 Besides building lines, the two areas for which the report emphasized regulation of private land use were commercial advertising and building heights around the New Haven Green. In both cases, Gilbert and Olmsted presented more conservative suggestions than they believed appropriate to the situation. The report suggested that unsightly billboards could be treated as nuisances." 6 It also noted the potential "offence to public morals or health through the nature of the advertisement,"" ' 7 thereby justifying invocation of the police power. The report ultimately concluded, however, that such arguments would be rejected by the "somewhat ultra-conservative" courts that were "cautious about interfering arbitrarily with an individual's use of his own property," and by "easy-going" residents afraid to risk "getting the reputation of being fault-finding busybodies."" ' As an alternative, Gilbert and Olmsted proposed a licensing and taxation program (which was never implemented after the report) on billboards and similar commercial advertising-a regulatory scheme to be sure, but well short of their ultimate goal of outlawing the "irritating and annoying" sights." 9 While writing the report, Olmsted and Gilbert corresponded extensively about the report's passages on building height limitations. Their correspondence reveals a great deal about what they considered to be possible under current legal doctrine, and within public conceptions of legitimate limits on private land use. They debated both the degree to which the heights of buildings should be regulated and how the report should advise New Haven to implement such regulation. The letters reveal that Gilbert and Olmsted considered the way in which Washington, D.C., and European cities fixed limitations (according to street width), as well as Boston's elementary form of zoning (enforcing different height limits in its business district than in the remainder of the city, placing the strictest height limits around Copley 
Id.
[Vol. 107: 1093 1114 Square). 120 Despite this consideration, however, they decided upon a minimal approach, suggesting a limit of a hundred feet for buildings around the Green, instead of the ninety-foot limits in Copley Square.' 2 ' As to the remainder of the city, the final report stated, "Limitations of height are needed in all our cities, but they should be as flexible as is consistent with the thorough practical protection of the common interest in light and air. "'
The vagueness of this statement was quite deliberate. In March 1910, Gilbert had suggested to Olmsted that the question should be left to New Haven residents and officials "to thrash it out among themselves as they undoubtedly would in any case no matter which our recommendation might be."' 123 By calling attention to the need for limitations, they aimed to ensure that "local conditions will develop what restriction can reasonably be fixed."' 24 By limiting their discussion, however, they were able to keep their report fairly moderate in approach and their conception of planning neither radical nor exploitative with respect to contemporary legal doctrine and assumptions about property rights.
The report's attempt to articulate a middle path between nineteenth-century "individualism" and "socialism in its controversial aspects" was meant to resolve the conflict between private rights and public needs, and it demonstrates the spoken and unspoken limits that planners perceived in proposing schemes to discipline the excesses of the modern city. Between "ultra-conservative" courts, an "easy-going" public, and legal doctrines only beginning to expand to meet the needs of city planners lay a relatively circumscribed approach to comprehensive city improvements in New Haven.
B. 1911-1913: Reactions, Aftermath, and a Bureaucratic Plan
The limits that New Haven planning advocates faced following the report's release in attempting to formulate government institutions to implement land use regulations and initiate municipal projects paralleled the limits that Gilbert and Olmsted perceived in their effort to devise plans within existing legal doctrine. As with the conflict over building lines, the wider call for city planning that the report articulated remained largely unfulfilled despite an administrative solution that temporarily placated those leading the campaign for planning. 
Id.
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Upon its release, the report was summarized in a number of papers, including the Union"2 5 and the Register.1 26 Laudatory editorials in both attempted to anticipate and answer potential criticisms of the report by focusing on the practical and economic improvements it promised. For example, the Union wrote:
There has been much fun poked at, and considerable ridicule heaped upon the so-called idea of the "City Beautiful." There will undoubtedly be many who will only be too willing to criticise as impractical the plan proposed by this commission to improve New Haven. As it unfolds itself, the proposed plan does seem a bit stupendous and will probably awe those who cannot see much further than the noses on their own faces. Yet there is nothing absolutely impossible in the report, and it is the product of the ability and experience of several men.'
Similarly, the Register praised the report as "practical," argued that the "City Beautiful" label was no longer appropriate as a result, and exhorted the public to read the report and work together to improve the city. 28 Another Register editorial, entitled How We Can Afford It, 129 praised Seymour for his willingness in interviews after the report's release to engage in "business talk at last, [and] to take the cold utilitarian view" of the program of city improvement.1 30 The editorial reported Seymour's emphasis that, because improvements would undoubtedly raise property values in surrounding areas, the city's tax base would expand, thus raising city income and replenishing the city treasury.' 3 1 Soon after the report's release, a series of events took place that demonstrated to Seymour and other planning advocates the need for a centralized, organized approach to city development and land use controls. In March 1911, the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad changed the proposed location of its new station closer to downtown.' 32 As a critical element in both the transportation system and the city center of the early twentieth-century city, the railroad station's site and the street approaches to it were crucial to the city's layout and circulation of traffic and commerce. Indeed, the Gilbert-Olmsted report had proposed widening and making more direct the approach to the station from the center of downtown New Haven, the Green.' 33 In the aftermath of the railroad's announcement, however, the solution that the report was supposed to represent-the expert, deliberative approach to city improvements, and the freedom from the vested interests of individual property holders and the vagaries of the marketplace-immediately seemed impossible to attain. Property owners at the proposed new Chapel Street site insisted on selling at prices that the railroad deemed "utterly unreasonable."' ' The property necessary for the new approaches could not be taken under the power of eminent domain because the land was not essential for the railroad's right of way.' 35 The attorney for the affected property holders argued against any attempt to condemn his clients' land. 36 Owners of commercial land in the vicinity of both the existing station and the proposed Chapel Street site fought for their competing interests in the potential move.' 3 The Register criticized the proposed site as certain to cause congestion and a needless waste of land that could be improved and beautified. 3 
'
A downturn in the railroad's economic fortunes in the summer of 1911 delayed plans for the new station indefinitely.' 3 9 By January, however, plans for a new station were revived by an offer from landowners near the proposed station to donate parcels of their property for a street approach from downtown.'" For Seymour, this haphazard method of planning and situating so important a public building was an indication of the need for a central authority to guide and advise the city as to its best long-term interests.'' A few weeks later, he interpreted this experience as proof of the need for a municipal planning commission and characteristically announced this conclusion on the pages of the Register in a long article called City by Its Errors Has Shown the Need of "Plan Commission. '"42 Condemning the rashly conceived, "piecemeal" approach to city improvement that the proposed railroad depot epitomized, Seymour claimed that a commission would have rationally and efficiently considered alternatives, thereby minimizing the costs 133 associated with the project and maximizing the benefits to the public. 43 His article reproduced in its entirety the Hartford charter amendment creating its planning commission and invited citizens, civic groups, and the city government to work together to pass similar legislation.'" Leading local figures proclaimed their support for Seymour's plan. 4 1 Three months later, at its first meeting after the publication of the Gilbert-Olmsted report, the New Haven Civic Improvement Commission resolved to work toward a charter amendment to establish a city plan commission modeled on Hartford's. 46 Seymour continued his attempt to gain support for the planning concept in a long September article in which he linked the current planning movement to New Haven's history of land use since the colonial era, 147 and in a December article tying what he saw as the diverse problems in New Haven-including the city's position as "one of the most conservative communities in the United States," the ongoing controversy over the placement of the train station, the need for further recreation facilities, and the regulation of building heights along the New Haven Green-to the lack of a city planning commission. 4 His work and that of others clearly had some effect on the Board of Aldermen, which passed the charter amendment at its November 25, 1912 meeting. 49 To ensure the amendment's passage by the state legislature, its authors copied much of the language from Hartford's amendment, and the Chamber of Commerce strongly encouraged its interested members to travel to the state capitol on the day of the vote.' 50 The state legislature approved the amendment in May 1913.' 5 ' In November, as secretary of the new Commission, Seymour wrote the Board of Aldermen that he and his fellow members hoped "to be of service in an advisory way to the Board of Aldermen, to whom [we] will report on all matters referred to the Commission, as promptly as circumstances and the character of the questions submitted permit."' 1 5 2 Chamber of Commerce President Ullman was pleased, and proclaimed in his yearly address:
With the creation of a City Plan Commission, many of the mistakes that New Haven has made in the past, in the laying out of streets, the erection of buildings, and the establishment of building lines, or the failure to do so, will be avoided. And this Commission, if it comes into existence, will prove most valuable in our future City planning. 1 Lewis Welch, in his annual report of the Chamber's Committee on Town and City Improvements, proclaimed his pride in the Chamber's role in the state's approval of the planning amendment, and claimed that the turnout of Chamber members at the state committee hearing on the measure was "'the best demonstration of New Haven's civic spirit that has been offered in recent years." ' 1 54 Seymour, Ullman, and those supporters who envisioned an active commission would soon be disappointed, however. Across the country during this period, planning commissions proved largely ineffectual. City governments, even where cities were given the authority from state legislatures to establish the commissions, were hesitant to grant much authority or funding to the newfangled agencies. In Connecticut, Hartford's planning commission, so envied by planning advocates in New Haven, was a hybrid public-private institution composed of ex officio governmental officials and private citizens with limited power and autonomy from the local government."' Similar problems occurred nationally. Although thirty-six cities had established planning commissions by 1913, these new administrative agencies remained largely advisory bodies; their main functions, according to even their proponents, were to coordinate and facilitate the efforts of more powerful governmental bodies.' 56 produced by the 1913 national city planning conference proposed a commission that was only an advisory executive department, with no responsibility or authority to act on its own. t58 As with both the national experience of city planning commissions and New Haven's precursor, the Building Lines Commission, the City Plan Commission's authority was circumscribed by design. Worse, the advisory powers that the latter enjoyed were at the mercy of the mayor and city legislature. Its funding was not fixed,' 59 thereby limiting its ability "to employ expert advice and to incur such other expenses as may be necessary."' 6 Other than to prepare "a comprehensive plan"' 6 ' (the scope of which was left undefined), the Commission's duty was only to consider and report on all public projects, and no administrative agency or government actor was required to pay attention to its declarations. 62 Its self-generated proposals had no weight of authority, 163 and although the city could act through the Commission in using its power of eminent domain, it was not forced to do so.' 6 ' The mayor's control over the composition of the Commission's membership gave him virtually complete authority over planning: Not only was he one of the five members, but he also appointed its two unpaid citizen members and its representative of the city administration, the city engineer. 65 A member of the Board of Aldermen, elected by the Board, filled the fifth and final post. 66 At the last minute, Seymour had attempted to increase the number of non-officeholders on the Commission, to make it less "political" and thus less subject, he thought, to vested property interests; but he failed to do SO. 167 In his letter of resignation in 1924, Seymour complained bitterly of the Commission's impotence during his tenure. 68 Arguing that the city continued to ignore areas that the Gilbert-Olmsted report identified as needing attention for planning purposes-including the railroad, the harbor, streets, and parks-Seymour referred New Haven's mayor and newspaper readers who commission came upon his open letter to the document whose creation he helped to initiate and organize:
I never urged anything but a "City Practical,"-the great aim of cityplanning. It was my misfortune and I think the City's misfortune, to have the sensational slogan "City Beautiful" fastened upon the project by the newspapers, by ultra-conservatives and by those whose chief pleasure resides in deriding progress and who delighted to dub my project "the dream of a dreamer." Against all such opposition then and now I call attention to the New Haven Report.'"
The local movement that advocated modem city building through centralized planning, best represented in the pages of the Gilbert-Olmsted report, had confronted the "ultra-conservatives" in municipal governance, in the interpretation and enforcement of legal doctrine, and among local property owners, and had lost.
IV. CONCLUSION
Early city planning in New Haven, like similar local movements around the country, proved to be a remedy that existed largely on paper-on the pages of a relatively modest report and in legislative acts and charter amendments. The failure of this effort stemmed in part from planning advocates' inability to control the political process and to build widespread popular support for land use reform. 7 ' Yet, these are only partial explanations, which fail to confront the historical limitations of the available legal doctrine and forms of municipal governance. While not entirely disabling planning practice, these limitations constrained what planners could propose-as demonstrated in the Gilbert-Olmsted report-and what municipal commissions could enact and enforce-as demonstrated by the Building Lines Commission and City Plan Commission.
In 1914, one year after the establishment of the City Plan Commission in New Haven, Seymour produced a pamphlet critical of a downtown marquee 169. Id., reprinted in SEYMOUR, supra note 1. at 598. 170. City planning movements in New Haven and throughout the country were led largely by elites. As others have argued, these movements attempted to impose moral order on urban masses. see BOYER. URBAN MAsSES, supra note 6, passim, disciplinary order on urban subjects and the growing metropolis, see BOYER, DREAMING, supra note 6, passim, and capitalist order on the sites of industnal production. see FOGLESONG, supra note 10, passim. Indeed, numerous segments of the local population-not only those property owners who were fearful of what they perceived to be an invasion of their inviolable rights. but also working class immigrant groups fearful of dislocation and increased policing of their neighborhood by the city-had ample reason to be wary of the rise of city planning. Nevertheless. Andrew Cappel's argument that increased land use regulations in the pre-zoning era failed because they were unnecessary and broadly unpopular--an assertion that he bases on the fact of elite control of the New Haven movement and his detailed study of reasonably coordinated land use patterns in one white, middle class residential area in northeast New Haven -is unpersuasive. See Cappel. supra note 17. built by the Shartenberg & Robinson store. 7 ' Asserting that the rights of the public in the sidewalk and in the air and light obstructed by marquees were paramount over the rights of property owners, the pamphlet, like so many of Seymour's similar efforts, failed to have a discernible effect on the city's physical environment. On the cover of the copy of the pamphlet that he kept, Seymour wrote: "It is of course certain that in time we shall have ordinances controlling the use of the streets by private interests. This 'Open letter' will bear fruit sometime."' 172 Consistent with Seymour's prediction, the fortunes of city planning would change as the century progressed and national city planning advocates began to share Seymour's hope for the future. As William Bennett Munro, a professor of municipal government at Harvard, put it, "[T]he mere establishment of advisory boards is a considerable step in the right direction; the mandatory powers will doubtless come in due time.""' The concerted efforts of planning advocates to push for changes in legal doctrine and municipal governments, and to coordinate and support their efforts nationally, certainly helped to push the legal limits faced by city planning in what Munro characterized as the "right direction."' 7 4 Thus, in 1926, the U.S. Supreme Court found comprehensive municipal zoning to be constitutionally permissible, a decision that constituted the most important legal development for city planning in the early part of the twentieth century. 75 That same year, New Haven passed its first zoning ordinance, despite public resistance and criticism. . For Seymour's later recollections of the events surrounding the pamphlet, see Seymour Quits Board, supra note 1, reprinted in SEYMOUR, supra note 1, at 593, 598. 172. SEYMOUR, supra note 171 (handwritten note on cover of pamphlet). 173. MUNRO, supra note 63, at 45. 174. For a striking illustration of the growing sophistication of planning advocates in legal issues, compare CHARLES MULFORD ROBINSON, THE IMPROVEMENT OF TOWNS AND CITIES 76-93 (1902), which describes ordinances limiting billboards and other public advertising, and id. at 271-94, which describes city governments, with Charles Mulford Robinson, City-Planning Legislation, in CITY PLANNING 404 (John Nolen ed., 1916), which provides a more sophisticated, detailed, and technical list of city planning ordinances and relevant legal doctrines.
175. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) . Ambler Realty summarized and utilized planners' ideological and legal arguments particularly well in its description of an emerging urban crisis and its assertion that the solution lay in a new regime of private land use controls. Justice Sutherland's majority opinion found the U.S. Constitution to be a flexible document that both authorized zoning and set limits on potentially more intrusive controls that "clearly" were not within the Constitution's realm of the permissible. Id. at 386-87.
176. See NEW HAVEN CITY PLAN COMM'N, supra note 15, at 3 (describing the first New Haven zoning ordinance); and Forbush, supra note 15, at 45-46, 83 (describing the history of the first New Haven zoning ordinance and focusing on the success of local manufacturers in protecting their own interests at the expense of the general public). In 1924, Seymour predicted that the local zoning ordinance, which was then being formulated, would be more effective as part of a coordinated plan, but complained that due to the lack of an adequately funded and authorized planning commission, this would not occur. See SEYMOUR, supra note 1, at 600. Fifty years after Seymour's initial efforts, New Haven would emerge as a leader in urban renewal and city planning under Mayor Richard Lee, who would graft upon the city bureaucracy a redevelopment establishment responsible only to the executive and responsive only to a select few constituencies. Lee's far more intrusive efforts to redevelop through massive relocation, destruction, and public and private construction would have seemed an impossible dream to the proponents of the City Beautiful and the City Practical.' 77 In the wake of the legal and governmental transformations wrought by the New Deal, World War II, and the Great Society, city planning was able to bring about the kind of reorganization of the community unimaginable to proponents of land use regulations in early-twentieth-century New Haven. 78 Despite their relative lack of success, by hesitantly challenging "ultraconservative" courts, traditional doctrines, and inefficient and self-dealing municipal governments, early city planning proponents in New Haven and elsewhere helped to initiate the process by which the laws and practices of municipal control over private land use changed.' 79 177. On New Haven urban renewal under Lee generally, see sources cited supra note 22. On the structure of the Lee administration specifically, see Norman 1. 
